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ABSTRACT 
After the conquest of Mexico, the Spanish Crown was faced with several challenges. The first was to balance 
the economic imperative to exploit its indigenous subjects with the moral obligation to protect them. The 
second was how to govern them. The creation of two republics –one Spanish, one Indian, both subordinate to 
the Crown– gave indigenous peoples the limited right to govern themselves, which could result in factional 
conflict as they struggled to survive, not only politically, but economically. Based on archival documents, 
this article illustrates this relationship by way of an in-depth examination of two examples –one from the late 
1500s, the other from the early 1700s– from Huaquechula, located in the fertile Valley of Atlixco, Mexico. 
This article demonstrates that the participation of indigenous peoples in New Spain’s politico-legal system 
contributed to the colony’s social transformation.
Key words: Traditional rule, town councils, indigenous elections, land and labor, town revenues, composi-
tions.
Autonomía política, faccionalismo y supervivencia económica: 
la gobernanza indígena en Huaquechula, Nueva España (1535-1735)
RESUMEN 
Después de la conquista de México, la Corona española se encontró con varios retos. El primero era mantener 
el equilibrio entre el imperativo económico de explotar a los indígenas sometidos y la obligación moral de 
protegerlos. El segundo era gobernarlos. La creación de dos repúblicas –una española y otra indígena, ambas 
subordinadas a la Corona– le dio a la población indígena el derecho limitado de gobernarse a sí mismos, que 
podía resultar en un conflicto entre facciones al esforzarse en sobrevivir, no sólo política sino económicamen-
te. A partir de documentos de archivo, este artículo muestra esta relación mediante un examen profundo de dos 
ejemplos –uno de finales del siglo XVI y el otro de principios del siglo XVII– de Huaquechula, comunidad 
ubicada en el fértil valle de Atlixco. El artículo demuestra que la participación del pueblo indígena en el siste-
ma político legal de la Nueva España contribuyó a la transformación social de la Colonia.
Palabras claves: Gobierno tradicional, cabildos, elecciones indígenas, tierra y mano de obra, bienes de co-
munidad, composiciones.
Contents: 1. Introduction. 2. The Indian Republic. 3. Early Indigenous Rulers of Cuauhquechollan. 4. «Re-
bellious Indians». 5. «Carried Away by Passion». 6. Summary and Conclusion. 7. Documental References. 8. 
Bibliographical References.
1. Introduction
Over the years, the effects of Spanish-style governance on the indigenous peoples of 
New Spain have been a matter of debate. Some studies conclude that the prehispanic 
politico-legal system underwent rapid hispanization (Borah 1983; Gibson 1964; Me-
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negus 1999). Others, augmented by indigenous-language sources, argue that, in spite 
of structural changes, prehispanic forms and functions of government persisted well 
into the colonial period (Cline 1986; Haskett 1991; Lockhart 1992; Martínez 1984). 
Still others suggest that, by drawing on both prehispanic and Spanish beliefs and 
practices, indigenous peoples «interacted with and helped shape an evolving colonial 
legal system» (Kellogg 1995: xxxi; see also González-Hermosillo 2001: 19; Kellogg 
2010a: 230). 
After the conquest of Mexico by the Spaniards and their indigenous allies in 1521, 
the Crown was faced with several challenges. The first was how to balance the eco-
nomic imperative to exploit its indigenous subjects, in their role as direct producers, 
with the moral obligation to protect them from arbitrary abuse (Taylor 1979: 160). 
The second was how to govern them. The Crown attempted to achieve this balance 
by dispensing royal justice through the legal system (Owensby 2008: 247). Traditio-
nally, it had governed by negotiating with competing interest groups which, in New 
Spain, consisted of two republics –Spanish and Indian– each with the limited right to 
govern itself. Negotiation, however, was asymmetrical, not a discussion between par-
ties with equal power (Cunill 2012: 393), as Baber (2010: 20) implies. As the Crown 
began to consolidate its power over its new colony, it also began to challenge that of 
encomenderos (Spaniards who were granted encomiendas or the right to indigenous 
tribute and labor), the mendicant orders, and even caciques (indigenous rulers) (Cu-
nill 2012: 399) by allowing indigenous macehuales (commoners) easier access to 
colonial courts to resolve disputes, both among themselves and with outsiders. At the 
same time, easier access to colonial courts disrupted the balance of political power 
within indigenous towns (Kellogg 2010b: 3), leading to factionalism. Who among 
them had the right to govern, on what basis –traditional rule or elected office– and to 
what end? In some cases, the end was not only to exercise their limited right to poli-
tical autonomy (Owensby 2008: 225), but to protect their economic survival. Given 
these conditions, it may be instructive to recall Bujra’s (1973: 133) argument that
«[factional] processes are in a dialectical relationship with other social and political 
processes going on both within and outside the community being studied».
With certain modifications, her (1973: 150) discussion of such a relationship 
–which she identifies with the modern state– can be adapted not only to New Spain, 
but to its social transformation.
Based on archival documents from New Spain’s early colonial period, 1 this article 
examines the case of Huaquechula, a town with deep prehispanic roots located in 
the fertile Valley of Atlixco in the southwest of the present state of Puebla. I suggest 
that the limited political autonomy that the Spanish Crown granted to indigenous 
towns such as Huaquechula could lead to factionalism which, in some cases, was 
directly related to their economic survival. I begin by discussing the concept of the 
Indian republic to highlight the change in governance that the Crown imposed on 
indigenous peoples and its potential for factionalism. I then give a brief overview of 
Huaquechula’s leaders and rulers from prehispanic times to the early colonial period 
1 The archival documents cited in this article are from the Archivo General de la Nación and the Archivo 
de la Tenencia de la Tierra en la Provincia de Puebla (Biblioteca Nacional, Fondo Reservado) in Mexico City.
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to explore the possibility of continuity of its traditional ruling elite and its implica-
tions for economic survival. In the two examples that follow, I illustrate the relations-
hip between political autonomy, factionalism, and economic survival in Huaquechu-
la. The first example from the late 1500s involved a factional dispute that arose as a 
result of Spanish interference in issues of land and labor. The second from the early 
1700s involved a factional dispute over the office of gobernador (governor) and the 
misappropriation of bienes de comunidad (town revenues). I conclude by summari-
zing my findings as they relate to the social transformation of New Spain.
2. The Indian Republic
Faced with the challenge of how it would govern its indigenous subjects, the Crown 
decided upon the creation of two republics: One Spanish, and one Indian. As long as 
Indian law was not contrary to natural and canon law, each would be self-governing, 
but not entirely autonomous from Crown rule. Because the Indian republic was to 
conform to Spanish notions of «proper polity» (Borah 1983: 34), Spanish-style ca-
bildos (town councils), each composed of an elected Indian gobernador and other 
officials, were established in each cabecera (head town). According to the Crown, 
Indians were free «to elect whom they think best» (Owensby 2008: 217).
The process of holding elections was not new to indigenous peoples. What was 
new was the expectation that they would be held on a regular basis. Although most 
elections were held without incident, some gave rise to ongoing electoral disputes 
as factions competed for control of cabildos (Haskett 1991: 27). 2 Factional disputes 
could arise for a variety of reasons (Castro 1998; Gibson 1964; Haskett 1991) –the 
candidate had personal shortcomings; those who voted did not have the right to do 
so; an election had not been held at the proper time or in the proper place; a goberna-
dor was in arrears of tribute payments. To complicate matters, Spaniards –including 
local-level administrators, clerics, and settlers– often tried to influence the outcomes 
of elections in order to further their own interests.
Drawing on Bujra (1973), Brumfiel (1994: 5) suggests that, because the leaders of 
factions tend be elite members of –in this case– indigenous society, they compete for 
«resources and positions of power and prestige» based on their «relative legitimacy», 
not on the «merits of substantively different social programs». In a similar manner, 
Gibson (1964: 178) notes that many factional disputes appear to have been based on 
the «loyalty of intimates and family rather than on political policies or ideological 
principles». As such, their goals were unlikely to challenge the power structure of 
colonial society. Instead, indigenous peoples became dependent on colonial courts 
to resolve their disputes (Kellogg 1995: xxiv). In fact, as Brumfiel (1994: 5) states, 
because factionalism is «non-revolutionary in intent», it is often dismissed as «non-
revolutionary in consequence». Conclusions such as these are what likely led Kurtz 
2 See García Martínez (1987: 198-199) for examples of conflicts between caciques and gobernadores in 
the Sierra Norte of Puebla and Hoekstra (1993: 212-222) for examples of conflicts between caciques and no-
bles in Tecamachalco and Cuauhtinchan, and between commoners and nobles and their factions in Tlaxcala, 
Huejotzingo, Tepexí, Tochimilco, and Huaquechula. All are located in the Puebla-Tlaxcala region.
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(2001: 111) to comment that, because factions proved to be less «dynamic» to the 
political process than they were initially thought to be, anthropological interest in 
them eventually waned.
Yet elections remained important to indigenous peoples because they «determined 
who would be entrusted with seeing to a pueblo’s [town’s] survival» (Owensby 2008: 
224) and, more specifically, to its economic survival. Land was, after all, the «distilled 
essence of local identity» (Owensby 2008: 28). Thus, instead of describing factiona-
lism as «revolutionary», whether in intent or in consequence, it might be better descri-
bed as having the potential to be transformative, not in the sense of the «institutionali-
zation» of conflict groups (Bujra 1973: 145), nor only of the daily lives of indigenous 
peoples (Kellogg 1995: xxxii), but of society itself (Brumfiel 1994: 4). Within the 
colonial context, indigenous peoples «did not seek to transcend their circumstances 
so much as they sought to transform them» (Owensby 2008: 308, emphasis added).
3. Early Indigenous Rulers of Cuauhquechollan
Because the ethnohistorical sources on Cuauhquechollan are fragmentary, only some 
of its Postclassic period (AD 900/1000-1521) leaders or rulers, whether mythical or 
historical, are identified by name. 3 After its forcible relocation from Atlixco in AD 
1443, it appears to have been –or to have become– a simple, one-tlatoani (ruler) alte-
petl (Lockhart 1992: 20), consisting of various calpolli (Asselbergs 2004: 301-302). 
In this, Cuauhquechollan differed from many other cities and towns in the Puebla-
Tlaxcala Valley that were organized –in whole or in part– on the basis of teccalli 
(noble houses) (Dyckerhoff 1990: 41-42), including Tlaxcala (Gibson 1952), Huejo-
tzingo (Prem 1988), Cuauhtinchan (Reyes García 1988), Tepeaca (Martínez 1984), 
and Santiago Tecali (Chance 2000). However, not until the early 16th century does 
tracing the descendants of Huaquechula’s prehispanic ruling elite become possible. 4 
In 1524, Huaquechula was one of several towns given in encomienda to Jorge de 
Alvarado. By 1531, the city of Puebla de los Ángeles had been founded, in part to 
3 For the Early Postclassic period (AD 900/1000-1200), see Muñoz Camargo (1998: §63), Motolinía (1995: 
5), and Historia Tolteca-Chichimeca (1989: §28). For the Middle Postclassic period (AD 1200-1430), see Alva 
Ixtlilxochitl (1965, tomo I: 136, 144). For the Late Postclassic period (AD 1430-1521), see Asselbergs (2004: 
51, 55) who, based on the 16th-century Genealogía Cuauhquechollan-Macuilxochitepec, suggests that nine of 
the individuals depicted were the founders of the nine barrios (prehispanic calpolli–subdistricts of an altepetl, 
or city-state) of Cuauhquechollan in AD 1443. However, the Suma de visitas, compiled around 1550 (Paso y 
Troncoso 1905, tomo I: 111-112 [Guacachula, fol. 81]), notes that Huaquechula had only four barrios, and 
11 estancias (outlying villages) not subject to it. After Hernán Cortés and his men arrived in the Valley of At-
lixco in 1520, the Cuauhquecholtecas were among various indigenous groups that allied themselves with the 
Spaniards to wrest their town from the Triple Alliance allies who were garrisoned there. Cortés (1993: 89, 93) 
did not identify the señor (lord) of Cuauhquechollan by name, but García Granados (1953: 1, 109) identifies 
him as Calcozámetl.
4 In prehispanic times, Nahuas bore only a single personal name. With the mass baptisms performed by 
mendicant friars in the early 16th century, each individual received a Christian name, but often retained his/
her indigenous name as well (Lockhart 1992: 118-120). By 1550, indigenous peoples were adopting Spanish 
surnames and, by the mid-17th century, indigenous surnames had all but disappeared (Lockhart 1992: 127). 
Early on, indigenous peoples adopted the honorific «don», which they equated more with achieved than ascri-
bed status (Lockhart 1992: 126).
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reduce the power of encomenderos by creating a class of independent Spanish farmers 
who were assisted temporarily by «Indians of service» (Hirschberg 1979: 241). 5 In 
1535, the Crown granted Huaquechula’s caciques, señores, and principales (nobles) 
–among them don Martín Cortés Xochitlahua and don Alonso de Meneses Xiloxochi-
catl– protection from possible Spanish encroachment on their resources (AGN, Tie-
rras, Vol. 2683, Exp. 4: 3r). In 1539, the Franciscan, fray Toribio de Benavente (Mo-
tolinía) (1995: 93), described how he met «Juan», Huaquechula’s «most important» 
indigenous noble after its lord, don Martín [Cortés Xochitlahua]. 6 And, in 1545, Vice-
roy Antonio de Mendoza awarded a merced (royal grant) to don Martín Cortés Xochit-
lahua, the ruler and señor natural [native lord] of Huaquechula, and to «the rest of [its] 
caciques, tequitlatos [tribute-collectors], and macehuales», specifying the boundaries 
of the resources only alluded to in 1535 (AGN, Tierras, Vol. 2683, Exp. 4: 1r).
The extent to which the political power of the prehispanic ruling elite was replaced 
by that of the Spanish-style cabildo in the central highlands of Mexico also has been 
a matter of debate. Some scholars argue that they retained their power well into the 
colonial period (Haskett 1991; Lockhart 1992; Martínez 1984). Others argue that, 
soon after the Spanish conquest, they lost their power to those who had no hereditary 
claim to it (Gibson 1964; Menegus 1991; Pérez Zevallos 1984), including macehua-
les –or, as López Serrelangue (1965: 96) refers to them, «nobles advenedizos [upstart 
nobles]». In part, it appears that, in those regions characterized by a «lack of political, 
economic, and social cohesion» and «the most rapid and intense» Spanish presence, 
the señorío (traditional lordship) was quickly replaced by the cabildo (Menegus 1991: 
100, 1999: 616; see also Kellogg 2010a: 230; Perkins 2005a: 29; Prem 1988: 231). 
Such characteristics, however, apply only in part to Huaquechula. With regard to 
its cohesion, Cuauhquechollan appears to have been an ethnically homogeneous (Na-
hua) altepetl that twice rebelled against domination by the Triple Alliance (Clavijero 
2003: 192; Cortés 1993: 93). Although one of the earliest references to a functioning 
cabildo in Huaquechula is from 1576 (AGN, Indios, Vol. 1, Exp. 73: 28v), after 
which references to caciques are few in number, several Spanish surnames such as 
Cortés –likely descendants of Cuauhquechollan’s señor natural– as well as Meneses 
and Morales –possible descendants of its calpolli leaders– appear more often than do 
any others in the highest-ranking offices of the cabildo. How, then, does one account 
for surnames that appear only occasionally or, sometimes, only once in the archival 
documents on Huaquechula? The literature suggests that macehuales –in the sense 
of commoners 7– seldom were elected to the highest-ranking offices of the cabildo 
5 After the epidemic of 1545-1548, the temporary system of Indians of service was replaced by the repar-
timiento (obligatory rotational labor) system. However, only after the epidemic of 1576-1581 did the Huaque-
chultecas begin to report labor abuse by Spanish settlers. The repartimiento system was terminated in 1633.
6 The Franciscan presence in Huaquechula dates from around 1529 to 1627. Among the calpolli leaders 
whose names appear on a fragment of Nahuatl text that accompanies the early 16th-century Mapa Circular de 
Cuauhquechollan (Asselbergs 2004: 303) was also «Juan» (surname illegible). Because calpolli were ranked 
relative to one another, this may explain his importance, although his name is not included among those of 
the caciques, señores, and principales who requested Crown protection of their resources in 1535. Two other 
calpolli leaders were don Hernando Cortés and Andrés Xiloxochicatl.
7 Martínez (1984: 162-163) explains that the term macehuales can be translated either as «commoners» (a 
social group) or as «subjects» (a social relation). In prehispanic times, lesser rulers were considered to be the 
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(Horn 1997: 46, 58; Martínez 1984: 156, 160). Thus, it might be more accurate to say 
that the prehispanic order was disrupted less by commoners than by different factions 
–with which commoners were affiliated– gaining access to political power (Cruz 
2004: 158; García Martínez 1987: 189; Martínez 1984: 140).
With regard to the Spanish presence, the altepetl of Cuauhquechollan had been 
awarded as a whole in encomienda, not divided among Spanish settlers, and it seems 
to have been minimally affected by the process of congregación (congregation) of 
indigenous peoples into nucleated settlements that would later give rise to secessions 
of sujetos (subject towns) from cabeceras, as occurred in other parts of New Spain 
(Dehouve 1984; Perkins 2005b). 8 At first, Spanish encroachment on its boundaries 
was slow. It was not until the typhus epidemic of 1576-1581 that the fertile Valley of 
Atlixco began to attract the attention of Spanish farmers and ranchers who, in 1579, 
founded the Villa de Carrión, 32 kilometers to the southwest of Puebla de los Án-
geles. As the indigenous population declined, Spanish settlers attempted to acquire 
more land and demanded even more indigenous laborers to work it. Huaquechula was 
not exempt from such pressures but, because it remained partly in private encomien-
da until at least the late 1600s, its encomenderos may have protected it from Spanish 
encroachment which would have reduced the amount of tribute to which they were 
entitled. A similar phenomenon occurred in several towns in the Sierra Norte of Pue-
bla (García Martínez 1987: 238 n. 49, 252-254).
4. «Rebellious Indians»
If the first example of factionalism is any indication, the establishment of Spanish-
style government in Huaquechula got off to a less than promising start. Early in 1589, 
Viceroy Álvaro Manrique de Zúñiga approved the appointment of don Juan de Tovar, 
«Indian noble» of nearby Ocopetlayuca, to the office of juez-gobernador (judge-go-
vernor) of Huaquechula (AGN, Indios, Vol. 4, Exp. 201: 63v). According to Lockhart 
(1992: 33-34), it was not uncommon during the early colonial period for an indige-
nous noble who was familiar with both indigenous and Spanish forms of government 
to be appointed to such an office to settle disputes. In fact, the dispute described be-
low likely served as the catalyst for the viceroy’s inquiry. On October 17, 1589, the 
gobernador, don Graviel de Morales, alcaldes (councilmen), and principales of Hua-
quechula reported to the viceroy that the alcalde mayor (governor) of Izúcar –who, 
throughout the dispute, remained unnamed– was collecting the rent on town lands 
that they had leased to Spaniards. 9 Although the viceroy ordered the alcalde mayor to 
subjects of more powerful ones and, during the colonial period, the indigenous elite often referred to themsel-
ves as the subjects of the Spanish Crown.
8 To date, only one record of secession has been found–that of Santa Ana Coatepec, a sujeto of Huaquechu-
la (ANG, Indios, Vol. 64, Exp. 149: 94-11r) in 1771.
9 Leasing lands was one of various sources of bienes de comunidad that were kept in a caja de comunidad 
(community treasury). The Crown introduced the caja system in 1554 to defray the costs of town expenditures 
(Haskett 1991: 63).
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explain why he was interfering in affairs that did not concern his office (AGN, Indios, 
Vol. 4, Exp. 21: 5v), he continued to do so for more than a year.
A month later, on November 17, the viceroy reported that he had reviewed the in-
vestigation that don Juan Ramírez de Arellano, juez de comisión (provisional judge), 
carried out at the request of the gobernador and macehuales of Huaquechula into 
(unspecified) charges that they had laid against four principals –don Pablo Hurtado, 
don Juan de Texada, Felipe Inocencio, and Estevan de Castañeda. In order that the 
town remain peaceful, the viceroy ordered that the accused were not to hold, nor be 
elected to, offices of the republic (AGN, Indios, Vol. 4, Exp. 79: 24r). Only a week 
later, the viceroy reminded the alcalde mayor of Izúcar that, because of the charges 
brought against the aforementioned «rebellious and malicious Indians», they had been 
suspended from office. Apparently, however, the alcalde mayor was friends with the 
accused, and was now carrying out investigations of the gobernador, alcaldes, and 
regidores (councilmen) «out of vengeance». The viceroy ordered the alcalde mayor 
not to «disquiet said Indians» nor to carry out further investigations of them (AGN, 
Indios, Vol. 4, Exp. 106: 34r), but it appears that the alcalde mayor was not the only 
one who interfered in Huaquechula’s affairs. In a second document from 1589, but 
lacking day and month, the viceroy issued «another» order prohibiting judges, priests, 
and friars from attending elections and preventing the Indians of Huaquechula from 
holding them freely (AGN, Indios, Vol. 4, Exp. 154: 50r). The problems continued.
On March 1, 1590, Viceroy Luis de Velasco I ordered that don Juan de Tovar be 
allowed to retain the office of juez-gobernador of Huaquechula to which he had been 
appointed, despite the fact that «those from Huaquechula» had opposed it. The vice-
roy also ordered that three «rebellious Indians» –gobernador electo (governor elect) 
Fabián de Castilla, Miguel de Santiago, and Baltasar Rodríguez– not be allowed to 
live in Huaquechula without express consent from their señorio, «under pain of per-
petual exile» (AGN, Indios, Vol. 4, Exp. 305: 94r). Less than a month later, on March 
23, the Indians of Huaquechula reported to the viceroy that don Juan Ramírez de 
Arellano, now corregidor (governor) of Ocopetlayuca (recall that, in 1589, he was 
juez de comisión) often sent alguaciles (constables) to take Indians of service from 
Huaquechula to work on the farms in his district. The viceroy ordered the alcalde 
mayor of Izúcar to report on the matter (AGN, Indios, Vol. 4, Exp. 375: 114r). In a 
second document from 1590, the first page of which is missing, the viceroy repeated 
his order to the alcalde mayor that Ramírez not be allowed to enter Huaquechula ex-
cept on official business (AGN, Indios, Vol. 5, Exp. 1: 70r). As to don Juan de Tovar, 
he was transferred to the town of Xochimilco (AGN, Indios, Vol. 3, Exp. 211: 48r).
To summarize the events described above, the viceregal approval of the ap-
pointment of a juez-gobernador for Huaquechula appears to have occurred as a result 
of the dispute over the collection of rent on town lands between gobernador don Gra-
viel de Morales and the alcalde mayor of Izúcar who, at least initially, had support 
from a small faction of principales. That the juez-gobernador happened to be from 
Ocopetlayuca was probably not a coincidence. He may well have colluded with –or 
been persuaded to collude with– the corregidor, also from Ocopetlayuca, to take in-
digenous laborers to that jurisdiction. Ongoing opposition from the Huaquechultecas, 
including their attempt to elect their own gobernador, suggests that they were well 
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aware of what was occurring. The problem eventually was resolved after the viceroy 
ordered that the corregidor not be allowed to abuse the repartimiento system. As to 
the juez-gobernador, perhaps he had outlived his usefulness to the corregidor. Gi-
ven the repeated complaints of outside interference in Huaquechula’s political and 
economic affairs, it is unlikely that the alcalde mayor of Izúcar was unaware of what 
had been occurring. In fact, he, himself, may have colluded with those from Ocopet-
layuca.
From 1593 until well beyond 1602, when Huaquechula was transferred from the 
jurisdiction of Izúcar to that of Atlixco, the town was fairly quiet or, at least, the do-
cuments reveal only sporadic disputes over the election of indigenous gobernadores 
or their actions, and occasional disputes with Spaniards over access to resources and 
abuse of labor. By 1633, the repartimiento system had been terminated and, by 1643, 
the process of Spanish composiciones (compositions) 10 had been completed. Until at 
least 1696, Huaquechula was still partly a private encomienda (Gerhard 1993: 56) 
and, until the second half of the 1700s –possibly when it reverted in whole to the 
Crown– it managed to keep its lands intact (Vigil 1992: 52).
5. «Carried Away by Passion»
The second example of factionalism involves a dispute internal to Huaquechula over 
the election of gobernadores, two of whom –don Miguel Cortés y Meneses and don 
Francisco Cortés de Morales– may have been related (Table 1). 11
The dispute began after don Miguel was elected as gobernador in December of 
1715 (AGN, Indios, Vol. 40, Exp. 14: 17r-18r). His election was contested by Miguel 
de la Mendoza, don Miguel de los Reyes, don Salvador de la Cruz, and «other nati-
ves» who claimed to have re-elected don Francisco and requested that the staff of offi-
ce be returned to him. After an investigation into the matter, which revealed nothing 
10 Implemented in 1591 and completed by 1645, the process of composición allowed Spaniards who could 
not show valid title to the lands they possessed to be awarded them if they made a monetary contribution to 
the Crown.
11 Because the archival documentation on Huaquechula is fragmentary, it does not allow for the detailed 
reconstruction of genealogies or cabildo office-holders as is possible, for example, for Cuernavaca (Haskett 
1991), Tepeaca (Martínez 1984), Santiago Tecali (Chance 1998), Tepexí de la Seda (Cruz 2008; Hoekstra 
2010), or Santa Cruz Tlacotepec (Perkins 2007). However, the reader will recall that, in 1535, don Martín 
Cortés Xochitlahua and don Alonso de Meneses Xiloxochicatl were referred to as two of the caciques, señores, 
and principales of Huaquechula and that, in 1545, the former was referred to specifically as its cacique and 
señor natural. In the Mapa Circular de Cuauhquechollan, don Hernando Cortés and Andrés Xiloxochicatl 
–probably related to don Alonso de Meneses Xiloxochicatl– were identified as principales (Asselbergs 2004: 
303). In 1575, don Gabriel Cortés, cacique and principal, and Benito Cortés, alcalde, were witnesses in an 
unsuccessful attempt to deny a Spaniard his request for a merced (AGN, Tierras, Vol. 2708, Exp. 4: 15 ff). In 
1589, don Graviel de Morales was the gobernador who reported to the viceroy that the alcalde mayor of Izúcar 
was collecting the rent on lands the town had leased to Spaniards. And, in 1619, the Crown awarded a licence 
to the cacique, don Francisco de San Juan, to wear Spanish dress and to ride a horse (AGN, Indios, Vol. 9, Exp. 
143: 72v). Lockhart (1992: 123) notes that, because «de San» had been dropped from indigenous surnames 
by the end of the 16th century, to retain it «created a name of greater resonance, likely to be used by peoples 
of higher rank». It may be no coincidence, then, that don Francisco de San Juan was the son of a don Felipe 
Cortés and the grandson of the cacique and señor natural, don Martín Cortés Xochitlahua.
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that would detract from don Miguel’s suitability as gobernador, Viceroy Fernando de 
Alencastre Noroña y Silva approved and confirmed his election on March 12, 1716.
By July of 1716, don Miguel had appeared before the viceroy to request that don 
Francisco be made to account for the bienes de comunidad that he had been responsi-
ble for during his term in office (AGN, Indios, Vol. 40, Exp. 39: 79r). When his term 
ended, he turned over to don Miguel only one key to the caja de comunidad, none of 
the revenues, nor the account book. 12 The viceroy ordered don Francisco to appear 
before the justice of Atlixco to explain himself and to present the account book. If 
it were the case that he was indebted, in whole or in part, to the town, he was to 
repay the amount immediately. It was later suggested that don Miguel had reported 
don Francisco in order to prevent him from being re-elected (AGN, Indios, Vol. 40, 
Exp. 136: 199r), but there may have been more at stake than this. On December 9, 
1716, don Miguel applied to the Real Audiencia for a license to withdraw funds from 
Huaquechula’s caja (AGN, Indios, Vol. 40, Exp. 93: 142v) –perhaps to successfully 
compose two caballerías of land on behalf of the barrio of San Martín Huaquechula 
in Izúcar (ATT-PP, Caja 13, Exp. 419: 14f). 13 In doing so, he may have been anticipa-
12 The document, which provides details of the tribute record for 1714, notes that both the account book 
and the revenues had been placed in the caja de comunidad. To safeguard the revenues, a caja typically had 
three separate locks and keys, the latter held by three separate officials (Gibson 1964: 213). In the case of 
Huaquechula, the gobernador held one key, an alcalde the second, and the escribano (scribe) the third. After 
their terms of office ended, they were to hand over the keys to their successors. A town was not allowed to 
withdraw more than 20 pesos a year from the caja without obtaining a license from the Real Audiencia (Royal 
Audience).
13 Not included in the process of composición until 1707 (Vigil 1992: 26), indigenous towns quickly took 
advantage of it in order to prevent further encroachment on their resources (Ruiz Medrano 2010: 103). One 
caballería was approximately 43 hectares of agricultural land. Although it is uncertain when the barrio of San 
Martín Huaquechula was congregated, the ties between Huaquechula and Izúcar dated back to prehispanic 
times. In 1520, Cortés (1993: 93) learned that the señor of Cuauhquechollan –likely Calcozámetl– had married 
the daughter of the late señor of Itzocán (Izúcar). Because Itzocán now lacked a «gobernador», their son was 
appointed to the position.
Table 1: Rulers and cabildo members, Huaquechula
Year Name Title
1535 Don Martín Cortés Xochitlahua
Don Alonso de Meneses Xiloxochicatl
Caciques (rulers), lords, nobles
1545 Don Martín Cortés Xochitlahua Cacique and señor natural (native lord)
Mapa Circular de 
Cuauhquechollan
«Juan»
Don Hernando Cortés
Andrés Xiloxochicatl
Calpolli leaders
1575 Don Gabriel Cortés
Benito Cortés
Cacique and noble
Alcalde (councilman)
1589 Don Graviel de Morales Governor
1619 Don Francisco de San Juan Cacique (son of don Felipe Cortés, 
grandson of don Martín Cortés Xochit-
lahua)
1716 Don Miguel Cortés y Meneses
Don Francisco Cortés de Morales
Governor
Past governor
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ting the eventual recovery of Huaquechula’s population 14 and the increasing conflict 
with Spaniards over what were becoming scarce resources. 15 In 1710, don Francisco 
also had composed four caballerias of land and three surcos of water (one surco 
was 6.5 liters of water per second) on behalf of Huaquechula (ATT-PP, Caja 3, Exp. 
211: 7v). But, because don Francisco had misappropriated the bienes de comunidad, 
perhaps don Miguel suspected that he had no intention of composing any more re-
sources.
In January of 1717, the factional dispute resumed (AGN, Indios, Vol. 40, Exp. 110: 
163r-165v). On behalf of self-proclaimed gobernador electo don Diego de los Santos, 
regidores don Juan Bentura, don Miguel de la Cruz, Juan Matías de Silva, and Pasqual 
de Aguilar, and «other voters, commoners, and natives» of Huaquechula, their lawyer 
argued that, before the electoral dispute in December of 1715 had been resolved, don 
Miguel had been handed the staff of office 16 and, «with malicious intent», had remo-
ved his clients from office. He then convened «certain natives», who he appointed as 
regidores, and proceeded to hold the election of December of 1716 early. After the 
Real Audiencia had returned his clients to office, they proceeded to hold their election 
freely and at the appropriate time. Thus, their lawyer requested that, until the present 
dispute was resolved, the staff of office be handed to someone who was not a member 
of don Miguel’s faction. On behalf of don Miguel, his lawyer argued that, although his 
client had been elected –legitimately, at the proper time, and without irregularities– to 
the office of gobernador for the current year, some natives of «restless and seditious 
nature» had tried to nullify the election, using «false and frivolous motives» to depose 
him and to hand the staff of office to a member of their own faction.
Faced with these conflicting allegations, the viceroy ordered that an investiga-
tion into the matter be carried out (AGN, Indios, Vol. 40, Exp. 136: 198r-199v). 
On February 24, 1717, the fiscal (Crown attorney) who had examined the results of 
the investigation noted that Huaquechula was divided into two factions: that of don 
Miguel, and that of don Francisco, against whom the Real Audiencia had issued an 
arrest warrant. It was well known, said the fiscal, that whenever an election was held, 
the members of one faction, «carried away by passion», opposed those of the other. 
The expense of maintaining them in Mexico City during the dispute was causing the 
«total ruin and destruction» of the común (commoners) of Huaquechula. So as not 
to prolong the dispute which had gone on for a full year, the viceroy reconfirmed the 
14 In 1520, the population of Huaquechula was estimated to be between 10,000 and 12,000 (Cortés 1993: 
92). In 1568, it was 10,329 but, by 1595 (14 years after the typhus epidemic of 1576-1581), it had dropped 
to 5,625 and, by 1646, to 2,922 (Cook and Borah 1979: v. III, 29). In 1681, the population was only 2,000 
people (Gerhard 1981: Table I). By 1744, the population was composed of 1,030 Indian families (Villaseñor y 
Sánchez 1952: t. I, lib. II, cap. XXIII, 348).
15 In 1706, the gobernador of Huaquechula, don Diego de la Cruz, and the alcalde of Huilango reques-
ted protection of their towns’ water source against dispossession by a Spanish hacendado (large landowner) 
(AGN, Mercedes, Vol. 67, Exp.--: 43r-44r). In 1595, the Crown had awarded protection of that same water 
source to the towns of Huaquechula, Huilango, Atzitzihuacan, Ocopetlayuca, and Tochimilco (AGN, Tierras, 
Vol. 11 (1a. pte), Exp. 1: 1r-20v). Such requests for protection of resources were common between 1591 and 
1610; Tecamachalco requested protection in 1560 and twice in 1591, and Tepeaca in 1561 (Martínez 1994: 
201-201, 213-214 notes 23-25).
16 The staff of office probably was handed to don Miguel during the electoral dispute so that the town was 
not without a gobernador to collect tribute (Castro 1998: 58).
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election of don Miguel on April 27, 1717, and imposed «perpetual silence» on his 
opponents. He ordered that, «under pain of six months in an obraje [textile factory]», 
the members of the opposing faction were to return home and to live «quietly and 
agreeably». He further ordered that, «under pain of perpetual privation of office», don 
Miguel was to treat his opponents well, without causing them «harm or vexation».
To summarize the events described above, this dispute seems to have been, on the 
surface, one over which of the descendants of Huaquechula’s traditional ruling elite 
–or members of their respective factions– would occupy the office of gobernador. 
Beneath the surface, however, it seems to have involved the economic problem of se-
curing resources for Huaquechula and its barrio in Izúcar. Because Huaquechula was 
transferred from the jurisdiction of Izúcar to that of Atlixco in 1602, don Francisco 
may have been affiliated with Huaquechula proper and don Miguel with its barrio. If 
this were the case, it is possible that the viceregal solution to the factional dispute was 
only temporary, but the archival record ends here. And, because there is no record of 
rebuttal from don Francisco in his own defense, the question of what had actually 
become of the bienes de comunidad remains unanswered.
This example appears to be the last prolonged dispute involving Huaquechula until 
around 1735, when religious orders, such as the Jesuits and the Carmelites, began to 
purchase haciendas (large rural estates) for sugar cane refineries in the region. From 
that point on, disputes over resources began in earnest.
6. Summary and Conclusion
Based on his extensive review of early colonial-period disputes, Borah (1983: 188) 
concludes that «[many]...were embedded in local politics and factional quarrels, 
at which a present-day reader of the record can only guess». His conclusion aptly 
applies to the two examples presented in this article.
Of course, there are differences between the two. The first example from the late 
1500s was an internal factional dispute provoked by an external dispute, occurring 
at a time when land and labor were still highly contested issues between indigenous 
peoples and Spaniards. Although outside interference in Huaquechula’s economic 
and political affairs was continuous, the Huaquechultecas eventually presented a uni-
ted front against it. The second example from the early 1700s appears to have been 
exclusively an internal factional dispute, occurring at a time of relative economic 
stability in Huaquechula. The repartimiento system had come to an end, the compo-
sición of Spanish land titles had been completed, and indigenous towns had finally 
been included in the process.
But there are also similarities between the two examples. First, the Huaquechulte-
cas’ political autonomy –the right «to elect whom they think best»– was compromi-
sed and their economic survival was threatened in both due to direct or indirect pres-
sure by Spaniards. Of necessity, this involved the reliance of the Huaquechultecas 
on the courts of New Spain to settle disputes that could not be resolved at the local 
level. Although the outcomes differed –«unity» in the first, «apparent unity» in the 
second (Bujra 1973: 144)– the goals were the same, that is, to defend their resources. 
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And in neither case did the courts deny them the right to do so. Second, although 
the archival documents on Huaquechula are not abundant enough to determine the 
extent to which its politico-legal system underwent rapid hispanization or persisted 
in prehispanic form and function, they do suggest some continuity of a prehispanic 
ruling elite –specifically, descendants of its tlatoani and calpolli leaders– in the hig-
hest-ranking offices of its cabildo at least until the second half of the 1700s. Whether 
through tlahtocayotl (lordship) or gobernadoryotl (governorship) (Ouweneel 1995), 
both caciques and gobernadores could defend communal resources within the con-
text of Spanish legislation (González-Hermosillo 2001: 19). Third, the two examples 
demonstrate that the interest of indigenous peoples in holding political office did not 
wane by the late 1500s as Gibson (1964: 192) suggests. On the contrary, their interest 
was as strong in the early 1700s as it was in the late 1500s.
Located in the fertile Valley of Atlixco, Huaquechula, like other towns in the cen-
tral highlands, continued to produce a surplus in tribute and labor which made them 
«indispensable» to the economic success of New Spain (Taylor 1979: 165). Thus, 
the Crown attempted to balance the economic imperative to exploit its indigenous 
subjects and the moral imperative to protect them. It did so by governing through 
negotiation between parties with unequal power –the Spanish and Indian republics– 
and by offering indigenous peoples easier access to colonial courts to resolve dis-
putes. But their participation in New Spain’s politico-legal system could disrupt the 
balance of power within towns and lead to factionalism. At the local level, they used 
the electoral system as a «flexible instrument» (Gibson 1964: 178) in deciding who 
had the right to govern and on what basis, and were «astute enough» (Haskett 1991: 
50) to know when to time disputes to their political advantage. Within the wider con-
text, they used the colonial politico-legal system as a «practical and moral resource» 
(Owensby 2008: 88) against arbitrary abuse by Spaniards.
Thus, I would suggest that indigenous peoples used the electoral system not only 
to exercise their right to «autonomy and self-rule» (Owensby 2008: 225) but, in some 
cases, to protect their economic survival. If factionalism was not revolutionary in 
either form or intent, its dialectical relationship with processes both within and out-
side of Huaquechula contributed to the social transformation of New Spain. To this 
end, Owensby (2008: 307) posits several alternative scenarios that are relevant not 
only to Huaquechula but too much of the central highlands. Suppose that indigenous 
peoples had not been able to challenge Spanish encroachment on their resources and 
abuse of their labor. Suppose that they had abandoned all hope in the law and simply 
surrendered to exploitation. Instead, indigenous peoples «took an active part in fra-
ming their lives and the colonial world more broadly» (Owensby 2008: 299).
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7. Documental References
AGN (Archivo General de la Nación, Mexico)
Indios, Vol. 1, Exp. 73: 28v. 1576: Huaquechula. Tasación de salarios al gobernador, alcal-
des y regidores de este pueblo, de las sobras de tributos.
Indios, Vol. 3, Exp. 211: 48r. 1590: Para que Juan de Tovar, indio que estaba por juez y go-
bernador en el pueblo que tiene por nombre Guaquechula, vaya al de Xochimilco 
a desempeñar el mismo cargo por espacio de un año.
Indios, Vol. 4, Exp. 21: 5v. 1589: Al alcalde mayor de Izúcar, para que informe la causa 
porque cobra las rentas de unas tierras que pertenecen a los vecinos de Huaque-
chula, y dispone de ellos.
Indios, Vol. 4, Exp. 79: 24r. 1589: Huaquechula. Para que los indios de este pueblo no 
tengan oficios sin licencia de su señoría.
Indios, Vol. 4, Exp. 106: 34r. 1589: Huaquechula. Para que el alcalde mayor de Izúcar no se 
meta a inquietar a los indios ni a hacer ninguna averiguación ni información contra 
ellos sin expresa licencia de su señoría.
Indios, Vol. 4, Exp. 154: 50r. 1589: Para que libremente puedan los indios de Huaquechula 
hacer sus elecciones sin que las justicias y cléricos se hallen presentes.
Indios, Vol. 4, Exp. 201: 63v. 1589: Título de juez gobernador del pueblo de Huaquechula 
en don Juan de Tovar por un año con 150 pesos de sueldo.
Indios, Vol. 4, Exp. 305: 94r. 1590: Para que Juan de Tovar, juez de Huaquechula, use el 
oficio de gobernador por el tiempo que estuviere proveído y que procure no haya 
indios revoltosos en el pueblo.
Indios, Vol. 4, Exp. 375: 113v-114r. 1590: Para que el alcalde mayor de Izúcar informe so-
bre lo que agravían los de Huaquechula, y si don Juan de Arellano envía alguaciles 
al pueblo y con qué misión, para proveer lo conveniente.
Indios, Vol. 5, Exp. 1: 70r. 1590: Para que en adelante el corregidor solamente use el man-
damiento con declaración que ha de entrar en Huaquechula, siendo llamado para 
negocio particular.
Indios, Vol. 9, Exp. 143: 72v. 1619: Licencia a Francisco de San Juan para portar hábito de 
español y montar a caballo por ser cacique de Huaquechula.
Indios, Vol. 40, Exp. 14: 17r-18r. 1716: El virrey aprueba la elección de gobernador de 
San Martín Guaquechula, de la jurisdicción de Atlixco, para este presente año, en 
Miguel Cortés y Meneses.
Indios, Vol. 40, Exp. 39: 77r-79v. 1716: Para que la justicia de Atlixco proceda a las dili-
gencias que se le manda a pedimento del gobernador actual de los naturales del 
pueblo de San Martín Huaquechula contra Francisco Morales para que dé cuenta 
de los bienes de comunidad que entraron en su poder.
Indios, Vol. 40, Exp. 93: 142r-142v. 1716: Para que el alcalde mayor de Atlixco y el cura informen 
el virrey lo que se les ofreciere, sobre lo representado por Miguel Cortés y Meneses, 
indio gobernador del pueblo de San Martín Huaquechula, sobre composición de tierras.
Indios, Vol. 40, Exp. 110: 163r-165v. 1716: Para que la justicia más cercana a la jurisdic-
ción de Atlixco pase a ella y efectue diligencias sobre la elección de gobernador 
del pueblo de San Martín Huaquechula y remite los autos.
Indios, Vol. 40, Exp. 136: 198r-199v. 1717: El virrey dispensa cualesquiera vicios que la 
elección de gobernador del pueblo de Huaquechula, hecha en Miguel Cortés y 
Meneses y otros oficiales de república para este presente año, hubiere habido y 
manda se lleve a efecto imponiendo a los contradictores perpetuo silencio y efec-
tuen diligencias para la quietud de los naturales.
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Indios, Vol. 64, Exp. 149: 9r-11r. 1771: El virrey concede licencia a los naturales del pueblo 
de Santa Ana Coatepec para que se dividan del gobierno de la cabecera de San 
Martín Guaquechula, nombren su gobernador y demás oficiales de república en 
presencia del cura y que el alcalde mayor de Atrisco haga se ejecute y notifique a 
los de la cabecera de Guaquechula, quedar separados de su gobierno. Jurisdicción 
de Atrisco.
Mercedes, Vol. 67, Exp.--: 43r-44r. 1706: Guilango y Guaquechula. Clase: amparo de po-
sesión. Recibe: pueblos de Guilango y Guaquechula.
Tierras, Vol. 11 (1a. pte), Exp. 1: 1r-20v. 1550: Huilango. Real provisión ejecutoria de los 
pueblos de Ocopetlayuca, Huilango y Tochimilco, sobre el uso de las aguas del 
río que llaman Huilango, que nace en la sierra de Tepanatl. Jurisdicción Atlixco, 
Puebla.
Tierras, Vol. 2683, Exp. 4: 164 ff. 1744-1804: Diligencias seguidas por los naturales del 
pueblo de San Martín Huaquechula sobre propiedad de tierras de la hacienda de 
San José Atzitzihuacan. En la primera hoja se halla la merced concedida a dichos 
naturales en 1545 de las tierras que se litigan.
Tierras, Vol. 2708, Exp. 4: 15 ff. 1575: Diligencias hechas por la justicia de Huexotzingo 
sobre la merced pedida por Alonso Bazo de Andrada, de tres caballerías de tierra 
en términos de Huaquechula.
ATT-PP (Archivo de Tenencia de la Tierra en la Provincia de Puebla, Mexico)
Caja 3, Exp. 211: 1r-7v. 1710: Autos y diligencias de la composición de cuatro caballerías 
de tierra aproximadamente, que poseen los naturales del pueblo de San Martín 
Guaquechula, y de tres surcos de agua de que sirven a los naturales del pueblo 
de Santa Ana Quatepec, su sujeto. Jurisdicción de la Villa de Carrión, Valle de 
Atrisco, Puebla.
Caja 13, Exp. 419: 1r-14v. 1716-1717: Autos y diligencias de la composición de dos caba-
llerías de tierra, situadas en términos del pago nombrado Tezonquipa que poseen 
los naturales del barrio de San Martín Guaquechula. Jurisdiccíón de Izúcar, Puebla.
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